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Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus’s 
integration with Russia in the security and defence field
Anaïs Marin
Although the Republic of Belarus is constitutionally designated as a neutral country1, it is in 
fact closely connected with Russia’s own security and defence architecture. Within the Union 
State of Belarus and Russia, the armed forces are integrated to an extent unequalled in the 
world. A legacy of the Soviet division of labour, the Belarusian defence industry complex 
remains structurally dependent on Russia, which is its main raw material provider, outlet for 
exports and intermediary on world markets. Bilateral military cooperation also builds on the 
perception of common threats and partly shared security interests. Hence it unfolds regard-
less of the disputes that sporadically sour relations between Minsk and Moscow, standing out 
as the main achievement of the Union State – if not the only one.
Integration with Russia objectively brings Bela-
rus1 security guarantees and financial benefits: 
in arguing that the military security of the Union 
State is conditional upon Belarus’s economic sta-
bility, Lukashenka manages to extract significant 
income in rent from his country’s buffer situa-
tion. In portraying Belarus as a defence shield 
against perceived Western threats he believes 
he is making himself and his army indispensable 
for Russian security. From a strategic viewpoint, 
however, Belarus is pivotal merely as a territory 
on which Russia could station additional military 
objects and missile divisions; Russia certainly 
needs Belarus as an ally to defend its Western air 
borders. Capacity-wise, though, the Belarusian 
army is negligible. Henceforth, the main pur-
pose of joint military exercises “West 2009” and 
“West 2013” (to be held in Belarus next Septem-
ber) is image-building, to sustain the myth of 
a strong Russia able to intimidate its EU neigh-
bours. Given that Moscow does not treat Bela-
rus as an autonomous subject in European geo-
1 According to article 18 of the Belarusian Constitution: 
”The Republic of Belarus aims at making its territory 
a nuclear-free zone, and the state –neutral”.
politics, Belarus’s return to (self-)isolation from 
the West since December 2010 has increased the 
regime’s dependence on Russia, thus narrowing 
its room for manoeuvre within the Moscow-led 
Eurasian Union and CSTO integration projects. 
In fact, Belarus retains little autonomy in mat-
ters of external security and it could well see 
the most strategic assets of its defence-indus-
trial complex taken over by Russian companies 
as well. Lukashenka’s bargaining game – trading 
off sovereignty for subsidies – is not sustainable 
in the long run; while it is a winning survival tac-
tic for him personally, it is not a sound strategy 
for securing Belarus’s independence. Given the 
interconnectedness between geopolitics and 
economics in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, 
integration in the security and defence field is 
likely to result in Belarus being irreversibly sub-
jugated to Russia in a structural sense.
* * *
Belarus was and remains the least independ-
ence-prone republic born from the implosion of 
the USSR in 1991. The military is particularly crit-
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ical of post-Soviet disintegration, remaining as 
it does devoted to Grand Russian traditions and 
Cold War perceptions of the West as an enemy. 
Thus, relying on Russia as a security-provider 
is more logical for Belarus than following the 
Baltic States into NATO2. Lukashenka made the 
formation of “a single defence space with the 
Russian Federation” a top priority, as confirmed 
by the Military Doctrine Belarus adopted on 
3 December 2002. 
Integration – completed
The 1994 Constitution proclaimed that Belarus 
aims to be a neutral and denuclearised country, 
non-aligned with any military bloc. Yet Belaru-
sian “neutrality” is as much a myth as the “multi- 
-vectorness” of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s foreign 
policy is. In fact, since 1997-1999 Belarus and 
Russia have been reintegrating within the Union 
State. Integration proceeded most smoothly and 
comprehensively in the military sphere. 
This stems from a shared perception of security 
threats in the region. Since Poland joined NATO 
in 1999 (when the alliance was simultaneous-
ly bombing Serbia), containing NATO became 
a strategic priority for Moscow and Minsk. Several 
joint declarations were adopted3 which echoed 
the engagements contained in national concep-
tual and doctrinal documents. As a result, the 
Union State functions like a military alliance: 
an external attack on one of its members would 
be treated as an act of aggression on the Union 
2 This does not imply that Belarus’s choice of military alli-
ance is irreversible, but it does structurally hamper it. Cf. 
Dzianis Mieljancoŭ, “Defence Systems in Lithuania and 
Belarus: Comparative Perspective”, Belarusian Political 
Science Review, vol. 1, 2011, p. 210. http://palityka.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/02/09_article.pdf 
3 A joint Defence Policy Concept (22 January 1998), a Se-
curity Concept (28 April 1999) and a Military Doctrine 
(26 December 2001) of the Union State. Since 2010 Be-
larusian parliamentarians to the Assembly of the Union 
State lobby the adoption of a joint Security Strategy, in 
vain though: Russia seems more interested in develop-
ing the ideological pillars of the CSTO than those of the 
moribund Union State.
as a whole, as confirmed in article 5 of Russia’s 
New Military Doctrine adopted on 5 February 
2010. Over 30 known binding agreements en-
gage the two countries in a close cooperation 
in the military-technical field, for coordinating 
border troops – put under joint command in 
19954 – as well as R&D activities and operations 
on the battlefield. Pursuant to the 1995 Collec-
tive Security Concept of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO), in October 1999 
Russia and Belarus also established a Regional 
Group of Forces (RGF). In peace time, the RGF 
combines the troops stationed in Belarus and 
in Russia’s Western Military District. For lack 
of a national strategic doctrine and operation-
al commanding capacity, in wartime the two 
brigades that Belarus contributes to the RGF 
(about 5,000 men each) would operate under 
Russian command, as part of the 20th Nizhny- 
-Novgorod Army. Meanwhile, joint exercises 
are held to enhance interoperability among the 
armed forces. The most significant of these mil-
itary exercises  were held in September 2009 
in Belarus (“West-2009”)5 and in 2011 in Russia 
(“Union Shield-2011”). 
It is fair to say that the Union State of Belarus 
and Russia represents a single security space. 
4 Kaare Dahl Martinsen, “The Russian Takeover of Belar-
us”, Comparative Strategy, No. 21, 2002, p. 405.
5 The scenario of West-2009 raised hackles and caused 
fear in Poland as it involved mobilising 12,000 soldiers 
over 3 weeks to simultaneously contain an act of mil-
itary aggression from the NATO bloc on Belarus and 
mass disorders orchestrated by a “5th column” (read: 
Polish minority) in Belarus’s border regions, and ended 
with the simulation of a “defensive” nuclear strike on 
Warsaw.
Belarus is pivotal merely as a territory 
on which Russia could station additional 
military objects and missile divisions; 
Russia certainly needs Belarus as an ally 
to defend its Western air borders.
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Whereas integration is achieved practically, 
measures taken by the Belarusian regime fre-
quently contradict the official rhetoric regard-
ing its political outcome.
Lukashenka’s conception of cooperation
In fact, Lukashenka consistently rejects Russia’s 
attempts to dominate the Union State. From 
the Kremlin’s viewpoint, his diplomatic free- 
-riding (refusing to recognise the independ-
ence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and his 
brusque burial of the common currency project 
in the name of Belarusian sovereignty hamper 
the potential for further integration. Hence, for 
the past decade Vladimir Putin has attempted 
to “marketise” Russia’s relations with Belarus. 
Minsk retaliated by boycotting the meeting that 
established the CSTO’s Collective Fast Reaction 
Forces (at the height of the June 2009 “milk 
war”). He also delayed negotiations over their 
joint regional air defence system (ADS), know-
ing that Moscow viewed its formalisation as 
a top priority6. For years, Lukashenka withheld 
the establishment of this legal basis. An agree-
ment was finally reached in February 2009, 
which he signed only three years later. The joint 
ADS has de facto been operational since 2008, 
and is continuously upgraded due to generous 
Russian contributions for modernising Belarus’s 
6 After 1991, Russia did not develop its own ADS to pro-
tect its North-Western borders, meaning that the Belar-
usian ADS de facto continued to fulfil this task. Moscow 
also wishes the joint ADS to become a model for other 
ADS in the CIS space.
air defence7. However, it still lacks a command-
er-in-chief due to the fact that Lukashenka ob-
structs the appointment of a Russian officer to 
this post.
By delaying integration Lukashenka sees a way 
to raise the bids for his geopolitical allegiance. 
This is part of a wider bargaining tactic and 
Belarus experts are all too familiar with it. For 
Lukashenka, the price of Russia’s security is Be-
larus’s economic capacity to play the role of 
a defence shield for the Union State. This rhet-
oric aims at justifying the need for Russia to 
contribute to sustaining Belarusian militaries 
and to equip them with modern weapons, ei-
ther for free or at discount prices. Belarus, with 
its limited defence budget (circa $700 million, 
which is about 100 times less than Russia’s) 
cannot afford such outlays8. So far this black-
mail has proven successful, mainly due to the 
support Lukashenka still enjoys in the Russian 
military establishment and among the provin-
cial nomenklatura of the Moscow ‘Rustbelt’ 
– where most of the officers in the Belarusian 
army actually come from. This helps Belarus 
secure subsidies for its army, albeit indirectly. 
The Russian budget does not directly spend 
money on maintaining Belarus’s infrastructure, 
but there is no question it supports its manpow-
er. For example, due to the lack of equivalent in-
stitutions in Belarus, all officers are educated in 
Russian military academies and faculties. Russia 
remains the ordering party in all military deals 
within the Union State however, so it gets its 
fair share of concessions as well. For example 
7 For example, in 2006 Russia transferred 4 divisions of 
S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Be-
larus for a ridiculously low price ($13 million each, i.e. 
14 times below market price). Cf. Ryhor Astapienka 
“Belarus and Russia Prepare for the West-2013 Military 
Drill”, Belarus Digest, 27 February 2013, http://belarusdi-
gest.com/story/belarus-and-russia-prepare-west-2013-
military-drill-13185
8 Владимир Мухин «Оборона Союзного Государства 
крепнет российским рублем», Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
25 October 2012, www.ng.ru/regions/2012-10-25/5_be-
lorussia.html
For Lukashenka, the price of Russia’s 
security is Belarus’s economic capacity 
to play the role of a defence shield for 
the Union State.
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in 1995 it obtained the lease until 2020 of two 
strategic military objects in Belarus – the early 
warning radar station near Baranovichi (Brest 
region) and a radio-electronic communication 
centre in Vileyka – free of charge.
The “shield” slogan surely helps sustain the 
myth, in the eyes of the Russian military and 
other groups which Lukashenka addresses him-
self to, that Belarus makes an essential contri-
bution to Russia’s security. This is make-believe 
however, as Belarus now appears to fulfil sym-
bolic rather than core strategic purposes for its 
neighbour’s security.
Belarus in Russia’s strategic thought: vital 
for prestige purposes, but no more pivotal
In the late 2000s many experts predicted that 
Belarus’s importance for Russian security would 
diminish. The geopolitical context had evolved 
compared to the previous decade: with the 
US-Russia “reset” and Barack Obama’s scrap-
ping of George Bush’s anti-missile shield pro-
ject, Belarus had become less pivotal as Russia’s 
bridgehead into Western Europe. Moreover, 
Russia was to rely less on military objects sta-
tioned on Belarusian territory after it upgraded 
similar installations or built new ones on its own 
territory. Whereas the Vileyka radio-electronic 
centre remained useful to the Russian army for 
communication spying and jamming against 
NATO neighbours, the early-warning radar built 
near Baranovichi became less important after 
a new radar station became operational in 2011 
in Pionersky (Kaliningrad oblast’). As for the Be-
larusian armed forces, their input in the Union 
State’s military might is insignificant9. The at-
9 Compared with Russia’s armed forces (1.26 million) and 
especially NATO’s combined forces (3.93 million), Belar-
us’s army of 60,000 (which certain estimates believe to be 
nearer to 48,000) is rather modest. Cf. Александр Алесин 
«Учения Запад-2013 не переполошили Польшу и Литву», 
Белорусские Новости, 18 February 2013, http://naviny.by/
rubrics/politic/2013/02/18/ic_articles_112_180876/. More-
over, Belarus’s ratio of active military (7.6 per 1000 capita 
according to IISS data, i.e. three times more on average 
than for neighbouring EU countries) is a handicap rather 
than an asset due to the costs implied.
tachment of Belarus to territorial defence prin-
ciples and conscription, and the alleged avail-
ability of 500,000 reservists throughout the 
country, would be a plus in case of a conven-
tional attack. In this highly improbable scenar-
io, the combat readiness of Belarusian forces 
would however certainly default: the only well-
armed forces in Belarus which are well enough 
trained and decently paid are the contracted 
military in its modest contingent to the Region-
al Group of Forces. Nevertheless, even these 
troops could not support Russia on an external 
battlefield since Belarus’s Constitution bans the 
deployment of Belarusian soldiers abroad.
Against this background, Belarus remains pivot-
al for the Union State’s security merely as a ter-
ritory on which Russia could deploy additional 
anti-missile defence systems (S-300 and S-400 
launchers). As for the deployment of Iskander 
mobile theatre ballistic missiles in Belarus, 
a threat regularly made for the same purpose 
of intimidating Western European neighbours, 
it is even less likely to happen than in Kalinin-
grad because it would violate Belarus’s CFE en-
gagements.
Russian strategic thought on Belarus is best 
summarised by the triptych “keep Russia in, Be-
larus down, and the West out”10. Strongholds 
of “paternalist” narratives argue that Belarus re-
mains an indispensable ally for enhancing Rus-
sia’s neo-imperial pride in its “natural sphere of 
interests”11. An irreplaceable partner – for lack 
10 Vyachaslau Pazdnyak “The Rise and Fall of Belarus’ Geo-
political Strategy”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 
2010-2011, Vilnius, 2011, p. 189. 
11 For a conceptual presentation of the role of the military 
in Russian schools of thought regarding Belarus, see the 
seminal work of Ian Klinke, “Geopolitical Narratives on 
Belarus in Contemporary Russia”, Perspectives, vol. 16, 
No. 1, 2008, p. 109-131.
Russian strategic thought on Belarus is 
best summarised by the triptych “keep 
Russia in, Belarus down, and the West out”.
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of a more loyal “puppet” – Lukashenka thus 
remains instrumental to symbolically sustain-
ing Russia’s regional power-projection. Military 
cooperation with such a bogeyman helps exac-
erbate Polish and Baltic insecurity perceptions 
– a consistent, paying-off goal of Russia’s for-
eign policy in the region. Pouring oil on the 
embers of Polish and Lithuanian anxieties 
is actually one of the geopolitical purposes 
of the “West-2013” joint military exercises12. 
In addition, Lukashenka’s governance model 
is a strong deterrent against the contagion of 
Western values and “colour revolutions” in the 
Eurasian space. With his Cold War mentality, 
Lukashenka serves as a foil in comparison to 
which even Putin appears as a moderate au-
tocrat and thus effectively obstructs the con-
stitution of a concurrent Baltic-Black Sea axis 
in Russia’s backyard. 
However the Russian leadership has grown 
weary of this ally who in the name of equali-
ty wants Belarus to be treated as a sovereign 
state, though he himself behaves like a provin-
cial leader blackmailing Moscow for cheaper 
gas and subsidies. Even though he zealously ad-
vocates Putin’s Eurasian Union project, in 2012 
Lukashenka proved to be a less than reliable 
geopolitical partner for Russia. Evidence of this 
include the July 4th “teddy bear” attack, which 
the Belarusian KGB failed to prevent and bor-
der guards failed to report on; the persistence 
of the “solvents” smuggling scheme, where-
by Belarus evaded returning oil export duties 
12 In January 2013 the announcement that war games will 
be held in Belarus the following autumn provoked pan-
ic in neighbouring EU countries, notably Poland, where 
the media were prompt to speculate on the heightened 
threat “West-2013” would represent for regional securi-
ty. This overreaction marked the success of stage one of 
Moscow’s “offensive” against NATO: a propaganda war.
to Russia (entailing a loss of over $1.5 billion 
for the Russian budget in 2011-2012); and the 
continuous postponing of privatisation prom-
ises, in violation of the conditions attached to 
Russian and EurAsEC crediting of Belarus’s in-
solvent economy. Given that Lukashenka can-
not beg for alternative (Western) loans until he 
releases and rehabilitates political prisoners, 
Moscow may be tempted to use this opportu-
nity to pressure him into complying with the 
geo-economic component of its Eurasian inte-
gration agenda. This includes granting Russian 
capital privileged access to, if not full control 
over, a number of industrial assets in Belarus. 
Flagship factories of the defence-industrial 
complex (OPK) will obviously rank high on Mos-
cow’s wish list.
From dependence to take-over: news 
from the defence-industrial complex
The Belarusian and Russian OPK have always 
been tightly interlocked. In Soviet times, 
Belarus specialised in the manufacture of high 
tech components (mainly optics and electron-
ics) and served as a repair and modernisation 
centre for military equipment produced in other 
republics. Under Lukashenka there has been no 
attempt at diversifying this production capaci-
ty. Instead, Belarusian factories have furthered 
their specialisation in these niches. They can af-
ford to modernise their production and gain in 
competitiveness only in limited segments (man-
ufacturing drones for example). Dependence 
on Russia, though, remains great and is now 
a synonym for increased vulnerability.
Belarus has no indigenous capacity for equip-
ping its own army with tanks, planes and rifles, 
so it must rely on outdated equipment from 
its Soviet stockpiles or import Russian military 
equipment second hand or at discount prices, 
in exchange for concessions or in the frame of 
barter deals. The Belarusian OPK remains de-
pendent on state procurement orders placed 
mainly by Russia, including as a sub-supplier in 
contracts with third countries that use Soviet 
An irreplaceable partner Lukashenka 
thus remains instrumental to symboli-
cally sustaining Russia’s regional power- 
-projection.
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or Russian weaponry such as Ukraine, Azerbai-
jan, Angola, Uganda, Nigeria, etc. Following 
the adoption of a Russian-Belarusian program 
aimed at enhancing cooperation between both 
defence industries13, on 24 December 2012 
Moscow granted Belarusian companies the 
same bidding rights as Russian ones to all gov-
ernment tenders including defence procure-
ment. Experts forecast that the expected com-
pensation for this apparent altruistic move is an 
engagement from the Belarusian leadership to 
open the national defence industry to Russian 
shareholders14. An additional factor of depend-
ence for the Belarusian OPK is its reliance on 
Russian connections in the search for outlets 
for its products on the world market. Belaru-
sian companies have made attempts to devel-
op direct connections with alternative buyers, 
mostly African and MENA countries, but even 
there they are sub-contractors in deals domi-
nated by Russian OPK companies15. 
In other words, most of the arms sales that Be-
larus can perform autonomously on the world 
market consist in reselling surplus Soviet pro-
duction – an activity which from 1999 through 
2006 earned Belarus 15th place in the world’s 
top arms suppliers to developing nations16. 
Although its stockpile of Soviet-era equipment 
13 Accelerating integration in this field was decided at 
a presidential-level meeting in Sochi in September 2012, 
and a joint programmatic document stepping up coop-
eration in priority fields until 2015 was adopted already 
on 23 October. The fact that deputy Prime Minister Dmi-
tri Rogozin came to Minsk for this meeting at working 
group level is a sign that Russia highly values this inte-
gration process.
14 «Россия готова скупить белорусскую ‘оборонку’», 
Belarmy news, 10 February 2013, http://belarmy.by/no-
vosti/rossiya-gotova-skupit-belorusskuyu-oboronku 
15 Михаил Барабанов «Оборонно-промышленный 
комплекc Белоруссии», Военно-промышленный 
курьер, № 23, 13 June 2012.
16 For an official value exceeding $1 billion, according to the 
2009 Report produced by the US Congressional Research 
Service under the ‘Belarus Arms Transfers Accountability 
Act’ (www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4436/text). 
The Trend Indicator Values database of the Stockholm In-
ternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), corroborates this 
figure, putting Belarus in 21st position among the top arms 
exporters in 2006-2012 with $536 million of export deliver-
ies (http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php).
should already be dilapidated by now, Belarus, 
with its limited domestic production, remains 
an important player on the world market. This 
breeds the suspicion that Belarus could in fact 
be acting as middleman for Russia in shady 
deals with infamous customers. Over the past 
decade numerous reports17 have alleged, but 
seldom documented, that Belarus is implied in 
conventional arms sales to countries placed un-
der UN embargo or US sanctions (Iraq in 2003, 
Sudan in 2005, Libya and Gbagbo’s Cote d’Ivoire 
in 2011, recently Syria)18. 
Even though most of Belarus’s 60 plus strate-
gic defence companies and research institutes 
remain in Belarusian hands19, whether public 
or (semi-)private, the whole defence-industrial 
complex remains structurally dependent on 
Russia. In the current geopolitical context, this 
makes the Belarusian OPK all the more vul-
nerable to Russian whims. Should Russia stop 
subsidising it (with cheap raw materials and 
17 See for example LTC John R. Pilloni “The Belarusian-Rus-
sian Joint Defense Agreement”, Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, No. 22, 2009, p. 543-548. 
18 Given the opacity of arms trade flows, the lack of reli-
able trade data from Belarus, and the dual nature of the 
exported equipment, there is not enough evidence sub-
stantiating allegations that weapons would have been 
delivered in violation of these embargoes however. Cf. 
Siarhei Bohdan “Arms Trade Charges against Belarus: 
Speculations and Facts”, Belarus Digest, 13 March 2013, 
http://belarusdigest.com/print/13320.
19 The most notable exception is Beltech Holding, which 
includes BelTechExport – the Belarusian leader in the im-
port-export of defence products. In May 2012, Beltech’s 
ownership was transferred from Vladimir Peftiev – on 
the visa ban and assets freeze list of the EU, which con-
siders him to be Lukashenka’s main “bagman” – to a cer-
tain Dmitry Gurinovich, a Russian businessman allegedly 
enrolled in the Russian Presidential Administration’s per-
sonnel reserve and whom some experts believe is a front 
party. Cf. “Beltechexport Gives No Commentary on its 
Sale to Mythical Russian Citizen”, Telegraf, 30 May 2012, 
http://telegraf.by/en/2012/05/belteheksport-ne-kom-
mentiruet-svoyu-prodaju-mificheskomu-rossiyaninu. 
Belarus could in fact be acting as middle-
man for Russia in shady deals with infa-
mous customers.
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electricity) or refrain from buying its products 
(as it is already threatening to do), the Belaru-
sian OPK would probably collapse. This is a crit-
ical trump card in the hands of Russian defence 
companies interested in buying the most stra-
tegic Belarusian assets in order to fully control 
the whole assembly line process. Among the 
juiciest companies whose capital Russia read-
ily pressures Lukashenka to open up are MAZ 
(Minsk Automobile Plant) and MZKT (Minsk 
Wheeled Tractor Plant, planned to be merged 
with KAMAZ). These dual-end factories man-
ufacture trucks and chassis, including missile 
launching platforms with no market equivalent. 
Among the other leading Belarusian companies 
that interest the Russian OPK are sub-suppliers 
of semiconductors for use in nuclear weaponry 
(Integral), high tech displays (Horizont), optical 
components for control systems of radars and 
lasers (Peleng) and optoelectronics for missile 
systems (Tetraedr). Russian constructors of mil-
itary aircrafts and armoured vehicles are also 
eyeing Belarusian repair and modernisation 
factories that readily service the equipment 
which they produce. A process of unification 
of Russian and Belarusian flagship companies 
is under way in some sectors, as evidenced by 
the establishment of Oboronnye Initsiativy, 
a consortium meant to play a leading role in the 
production of electronic warfare suites for the 
Russian armed forces20.
20 HIS Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Defence Pro-
duction and R&D – Belarus”, Russia and the CIS brief, 
21 February 2013.
Conclusion: sombre prospects
In his role as a “sovereignty entrepreneur” ea-
ger to sell Belarus’s assets at the highest price 
and at his own pace, Lukashenka might not 
however be in a geopolitical position to resist 
Russian ambitions to control the Belarusian 
defence sector. One of the many paradoxes in 
Lukashenka’s style of government is that it uses 
most of the canons of a military dictatorship, 
while at the same time trading off the country’s 
sovereignty, its security system and military to 
a foreign, ex-colonial power. Part of the Belaru-
sian military is probably happy with this state 
of affairs, as it meets their demand for restor-
ing a strong alliance reminiscent of past Red 
Army glory. The outcome of the ongoing inte-
gration processes is however without question 
concerning for a growing share of Belarusians. 
If the human factor is critical for guaranteeing 
the loyalty of an army – whether to the country, 
its leader, or a foreign power – then the “morale 
of the troops” in Belarus surely deserves further 
investigation. In Belarus the military feel disfa-
voured compared to the “siloviki” – the militia, 
special security forces and KGB – the segment 
of the security apparatus which Lukashenka is 
relying on as his main support base and the 
only one worthy of privileges.
Another source for concern is the gap between 
the discourses of Belarusian and Russian offi-
cials regarding the purpose, modalities and 
outcome of accelerated cooperation in the mil-
itary field. The Belarusian regime pretends to 
keep the upper hand in the integration process, 
and confidently refuses to envisage selling stra-
tegic industrial assets to Russia in spite of the 
insolvability risk weighing upon Belarus’s econ-
omy. In Moscow, however, the tone is radically 
different. In fact, from a strictly military view-
point, Belarus has indeed no existence as a sep-
arate entity from Russia. An ideological kin and 
a military appendage prolonging Russian terri-
tory, Belarus is doomed to also give up control 
of its defence-industrial complex. The takeover 
Lukashenka might not be in a geopoliti-
cal position to resist Russian ambitions 
to control the Belarusian defence sector.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 107 8
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk 
Nicholas Furnival 
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska, 
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski 
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
of the Belarusian OPK is just a matter of time. 
Irrespective of Lukashenka’s lifespan in power, 
the end-result of the Moscow-led integration in 
the military field is the consolidation of a struc-
tural dependence on Russia which makes the 
prospect of Belarus shifting its geopolitical al-
liance and turning to the West to guarantee its 
security ever less probable.
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